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The Comeback of the EU as a “Civilian 
Power” through the Arab Spring?
Martin Beck
On 12 October 2012, the European Union was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for, among 
other things, “the successful struggle for peace and reconciliation and for democracy 
and human rights,” as the official press release states.
Analysis
The Nobel Prize organization’s explanatory statement matches the EU’s traditional self-
image as a “civilian power” not only in European affairs but also in its foreign relations. 
However, when applied to the EU’s policy towards the countries south of the Mediter-
ranean, the civilian power approach exhibits many problems. 
  The Arab Spring has repoliticized cross-Mediterranean relations. In the 1970s, the 
EU based its self-image as an actor in international relations on a civilian power ap-
proach. The aspirations of an ideal civilian power are based on the promotion of 
nonviolent conflict resolution, democratic values and social justice. Yet in the de-
cade prior to the Arab Spring at the latest, the EU’s approach towards the Arab 
world had become very “pragmatic,” meaning that European claims regarding the 
EU’s progressive foreign policy were purely rhetorical.
  Still, a heated, partially ideologically charged debate among scholars – and politi-
cians – on the EU’s self-image continued. The main reason the approach managed 
to remain on the agenda, despite empirical counterevidence, was that the pre-Arab 
Spring environment, with its authoritarian regimes, was hostile to a civilian power.
  With the Arab Spring, a quasi-experimental situation has emerged; whether the Eu-
ropean self-image matches the reality thus needs to be tested. Since the Arab Spring 
it has certainly become more common for European politicians to use major ele-
ments of the civilian power approach on the rhetorical level.
  When compared with major empirical developments since the Arab Spring, the ci-
vilian power approach does not adequately explain European relations with the 
countries south of the Mediterranean.
Keywords: EU, cross-Mediterranean relations, civilian power approach, Arab Spring
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The EU as a “Civilian Power:” A Heated and 
Politicized Debate
A scientific article written by Karen E. Smith 
(2005: 63) “attempts to knock off once and for all 
the idea of ‘civilian power EU’, and indeed the 
idea of naming the EU as a specific kind of inter-
national actor.” If this was indeed the author’s in-
tention, she failed: other scholars have continued 
to hold up the concept and its application to the 
EU. For instance, Mario Telo (2007: 35) insists that 
the civilian power concept is fruitful for analyz-
ing the foreign policies of the EU, thereby empha-
sizing the distinctiveness of the EU as an actor in 
international relations (Telo 2007: 36). In a speech 
given on 2 March 2011, EU High Representative 
for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Catherine 
Ashton characterized European foreign policy as 
follows: “the strength of the EU lies, paradoxical-
ly, in its inability to throw its weight around. Its 
influence flows from the fact that it is disinterest-
ed in its support for democracy, development and 
the rule of law. It can be an honest broker – but 
backed up by diplomacy, aid and great experi-
ence.” These and other statements using module 
components of the civilian power approach out-
raged James Rogers (2011), editor of the European 
Geostrategy blog, who commented, “the High Rep-
resentative seems to have danced off into the land 
of the Cheshire cat.”
The debate appears to be so heated mainly 
for two reasons. Firstly, from a political point of 
view, the EU’s self-image implies that that its ap-
proach is guided by high normative standards, 
and thereby minimizes its self-interests, some-
times to the extent that its tone is self-congratu-
latory. When analysts of European policy come to 
the conclusion that many European policies ap-
pear to be based on “hard” interests such as se-
curity or trade, they very often consider it part of 
their task to dismantle the proclaimed high mor-
al standards of the EU as pure “rhetoric” or “ide-
ology.” This leads to the second point, which has 
to do with the academic civilian power approach. 
This quite sophisticated approach, which was de-
veloped on the basis of ideas derived from con-
structivist theories, constitutes a particular chal-
lenge for critics. From their point of view it might 
be rather easy – perhaps even boring – to disman-
tle idealistic descriptions of American foreign pol-
icy as “rhetoric” that hides “hard” interests since 
the general public (beyond the borders of Amer-
ica) and most scholars are rather disinclined to 
take the self-image of American administrations 
too seriously. This is different in the case of Euro-
pean foreign policy.
Whatever one thinks of its usefulness in pro-
ducing fruitful insights for the analysis of Euro-
pean foreign policy, the civilian power approach 
has been developed and refined by renowned re-
searchers – such as Hanns W. Maull. The basic 
idea is that the foreign policy of (some) actors, 
such as the EU, follows a logic of appropriateness 
rather than a logic of consequentiality. Thus, in 
contrast to classic theories such as realism, the ci-
vilian power approach as inspired by constructiv-
ism assumes that values and norms shape inter-
est generation. The convictions of a civilian power 
are based on the “civilizational hexagon,” as de-
veloped by Dieter Senghaas, according to which 
foreign policy aims for (the improvement of) “ef-
fective control of private violence through the mo-
nopolization of force; a culture of non-violent res-
olution of political disputes; rule of law; develop-
ment of social division of labour and institutions; 
participation in decision-making by those affected 
by them; and social justice” (Maull 2000: 14–15).
Recent Developments in Cross-Mediterranean 
Relations: An Irony of History
In the 1980s and 1990s, the EU launched policies 
towards its neighbors on the southern side of the 
Mediterranean that demonstrated a rhetoric com-
patible with the values of the civilizational hexa-
gon. Among the highlights was the Venice Decla-
ration (1980), in which the EU stated that the “Pal-
estinian Question” is qualitatively different from 
a mere refugee problem. In sharp contrast to the 
then position of the US, the EU acknowledged the 
Palestinians as a people and demanded that the 
PLO be integrated into negotiations on a compre-
hensive peace in the Middle East. Also, by launch-
ing the Barcelona Process in 1995, the EU explic-
itly propagated cooperation aimed at generating 
a common area of peace and stability and a zone 
of shared prosperity supplemented by (and based 
on) a social, cultural and human partnership.
Upon the tenth anniversary of the Barcelo-
na Process, assessments of the process’s success 
in terms of achievements related to the values of 
the civilian power approach were nearly unani-
mously negative. The authoritarianism of the en-
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tire Southern Mediterranean region remained un-
shaken. Moreover, at the beginning of the twenty-
first century, there could be hardly any doubt that 
the crisis the Arab world was going through in 
terms of its socioeconomic development and the 
human security provided to its people was at least 
as severe as that in the 1990s. In subsequent years 
and continuing up to the start of the Arab Spring, 
not only the EU’s actual foreign policy but also its 
reasoning and legitimization departed very much 
from the idea(l)s on which the civilian power ap-
proach is based. The agenda of the Union for the 
Mediterranean adopted a purely technical ap-
proach. The initiatives and projects to be launched 
by the union carefully avoided any issues related 
to politics, focusing instead on fields in which po-
tential technical win-win situations had been iden-
tified – for example, joint energy projects (Schlum-
berger 2011). At the same time, foreign policy to-
wards the Middle East was increasingly left to sin-
gle member states of the EU, which developed or 
already had close relationships with authoritarian 
Arab regimes.
It is an irony of history that when the EU, at 
least on the rhetorical level, was prepared to pro-
mote Arab democratization in the mid-1990s, 
it could find no counterparts in the Middle East 
powerful enough to challenge regional authoritar-
ianism. However, when the Arab Spring occurred, 
the EU and its members were ill prepared since 
they had come to terms with Arab authoritarian-
ism. Thus, some members of the EU – in particular 
France, represented by then foreign minister Mi-
chèle Alliot-Marie – were actually among the last 
to break ties with one of the most repressive lead-
ers in the history of the modern Middle East, Zine 
El Abidine Ben Ali (president of Tunisia from 1987 
to 2011).
One could imagine that the reality of European 
foreign policy towards the Middle East could have 
been the final nail in the coffin for applying the ci-
vilian power approach to EU foreign policy. Yet, 
as has been outlined, this was not the case. Part of 
the explanation is that although value-based rhet-
oric in EU papers on the Southern Mediterranean 
region became less pronounced in the first decade 
of the twenty-first century, the EU and its repre-
sentatives never explicitly abandoned their val-
ue-based approach. The EU more or less explic-
itly continued to uphold the image of being a dif-
ferent type of – meant to imply less selfish – actor 
in international relations. Thus, some scholars and 
observers stuck to the concept, and others used it 
to illustrate the gap between normative pretense 
and empirical reality – for instance, Peter Seeberg 
(2009) in his description of the “EU as a realist ac-
tor in normative clothes.” Yet, there was also an-
other reason for the survival of the concept’s ap-
plication to cross-Mediterranean relations: it was 
very difficult for a civilian power to act successful-
ly in the countries of the Southern Mediterranean 
region before the Arab Spring (Beck 2012). Thus, 
two years after the start of the Arab Spring, it 
seems appropriate to raise the question of wheth-
er there are indicators that the EU is now acting as 
a civilian power in the Middle East given the fact 
that the “excuse” that the Arab world represents 
a hostile environment for a civilian power is ob-
solete.
The keynote address given by EU Commission 
president José Manuel Barroso on 14 July 2012 in 
Cairo points in this direction. In a speech of re-
markable self-criticism, he stated that “In the past 
too many have traded democracy for stability.” In 
combination with the amendment that “the road 
to democracy is not a peaceful stream of water 
but rather an unpredictable river much like the 
Nile used to be before the Aswan Dam,” Barro-
so’s statement can be understood as the essence of 
a foreign policy program towards the Arab world 
that takes some basic insights of academic Interna-
tional Relations seriously and draws conclusions 
compatible with the civilian power approach: in 
relations with systems in transition, such as those 
produced by the Arab Spring, a trade-off between 
democratization and stabilization indeed exists. 
Due to the fact that the degree of participation (of 
democratic as well as undemocratic groups) in de-
mocratization processes is high and democratic 
institutions are not (yet) consolidated, democrati-
zation processes are complex and notoriously pro-
duce setbacks, very often taking what appears to 
be a zigzag course. If a long-term perspective is 
applied, a civilian power is supposed to both tol-
erate this and actively promote democratization, 
thereby holding up the vision of the “democratic 
peace” according to which genuine long-term sta-
bility based on shared democratic values will ul-
timately be achieved only between democracies; 
in contrast, cooperative relations with authoritar-
ian regimes do not have the potential to generate 
more than short- to medium-term stability.
Beyond Barroso’s rhetoric of the EU as a civil-
ian power after the Arab Spring, are there indica-
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tors that the EU is really inclined to walk the talk 
of a civilian power in its relations with the Arab 
world? Three dimensions seem to be crucial in as-
sessing whether the EU is using the opportuni-
ty of the Arab Spring for a comeback as a civil-
ian power. Firstly, has the EU actively supported 
democratization processes? Secondly, has the EU 
developed adequate approaches to support de-
mocratization in the Southern Mediterranean re-
gion? And finally, has cooperation on crucial pol-
icies been reorganized in a way that is supportive 
to democratization?
Active Support for Democratization Processes?
In many cases providing active support for the de-
mocratization processes of specific countries is a 
very difficult task, even for an ideal civilian pow-
er. Sometimes, potential target countries (such as 
Egypt) react rather sensitively to overly proactive 
support, which can be perceived as interference in 
internal affairs. In other cases (for example, in civ-
il war situations such as that in Syria) supporting 
democratization with the means available to a ci-
vilian power is extremely complicated. However, 
there has been one case in which the internation-
al community was actively asked to support a pro-
cess that had the potential to promote democrati-
zation: In September 2011 the Palestinian leader-
ship of the West Bank, represented by President 
Mahmud Abbas, announced its eagerness to gain 
recognition as a full member of the United Na-
tions. 
Although the Palestinian Authority (PA) in the 
West Bank suffers from a democratic deficit, since 
Prime Minister Salim Fayyad was appointed by the 
president rather than elected by the parliament, 
the recognition of Palestine as a state could be de-
cisive in terms of democratization since it would 
imply that those who support it strongly demand 
the end of occupation by Israel, one of the major 
authoritarian regimes in the Middle East that has 
not been shaken by the Arab Spring. Moreover, 
the Palestinian demand for full membership as 
a state is a logical follow-up to the Fayyad Plan, 
which was approved by the West and according to 
which the PA was required to establish proto-state 
institutions. A civilian power approach would de-
mand that when the World Bank (2012) official-
ly assessed the Palestinian proto-state institutions 
as effective, support for the Palestinian proposal 
should have been granted – especially as the bilat-
eral approach of negotiations between the Pales-
tinians and Israelis had been declared a failure by 
no less than US president Barack Obama. He stat-
ed in December 2010 that he had given up on con-
vincing Israel to accept even a temporary settle-
ment freeze in the occupied territories. 
However, the EU did not provide a statement 
of support. Moreover, when the PA – due to the 
US threat that it would veto Palestine’s full mem-
bership in the UN – applied for full membership 
in UNESCO (which cannot be vetoed by the mem-
bers of the Security Council), the EU proved to be 
unprepared and ineffective as the “Big Three” vot-
ed in three different ways in October 2011: France 
voted yes; the United Kingdom abstained; and 
Germany voted no. Even when in September 2012 
Abbas decided, based on the incidents previously 
described, to set his sights lower, announcing that 
Palestine would strive only for an upgrade of its 
current status as a “non-member observer entity” 
to a “non-member observer state,” the EU did not 
deliver any kind of coordinated support. This was 
despite the fact that just before Abbas’s speech in 
the General Assembly the World Bank had con-
firmed its positive evaluation of the Palestinian 
proto-state building process, at the same time sin-
gling out Israeli occupation as the decisive factor 
inhibiting further progressive development in the 
West Bank. To summarize, the EU’s recent poli-
cy towards Palestine does not meet even the basic 
standards of a civilian power.
Another critical question worthy of examina-
tion is how the EU has handled democratically 
elected Islamist governments. In two crucial cas-
es in the past, the EU contributed to the marginal-
ization of democratically elected Islamist parties: 
in Algeria in 1991 and in the Palestinian territo-
ries in 2006. In both cases, the ruling authoritari-
an party leadership – the Front de Libération Na-
tionale (FLN) and Fatah – attempted to gain legit-
imacy by holding elections. In both cases they as-
sumed that their control of authoritarian means 
would be sufficient for them to win. Although the 
winners – Front Islamique du Salut (Islamic Salva-
tion Front, FIS) and Hamas – were not democratic 
parties, democratization could have been the out-
come if Hamas and Fatah as well as FIS and FLN, 
respectively, had been provided with a fair chance 
to develop. Yet in both cases the EU decided to 
support the former regime, mainly due to the rea-
soning that the democratically elected parties had 
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an anti-Western agenda and could not be expect-
ed to easily accept Western terms of cooperation. 
When, as a result of fair elections in Tunisia and 
Egypt, Islamist actors succeeded in 2011, the EU 
did not repeat the mistakes of the past. Since the 
Arab Spring, the European Union has so far met 
the standards of a civilian power by recognizing 
the winning Islamist parties as such. 
New Efforts to Support Democratization?
There are two new approaches that have been 
launched by the EU as a response to the Arab 
Spring. First, on the conceptual level, the old de 
facto approach of “one size fits all” has been re-
placed by a new one officially labeled “more for 
more.” As the “association agreements” make 
very apparent, in the past the EU hardly based co-
operation in economics and other fields on condi-
tions related to political criteria. This meant, on 
the one hand, that an extremely repressive regime 
such as Tunisia under Ben Ali could benefit from 
European support to a high degree and, on the 
other, that more liberal autocracies such as Mo-
rocco did not receive further incentives to deepen 
political liberalization. Thus, the idea of “more for 
more” is appropriate for a civilian power. Howev-
er, thus far it has not been converted into an im-
plementable foreign policy concept. Such a conver-
sion would require the development of tools for a 
continuous and thorough evaluation of the differ-
ent democratization and liberalization processes 
according to transparent criteria and benchmarks. 
The application of transparent criteria appears in-
deed to be of utmost importance in order to avoid 
the application of a “more for more” approach on 
the basis of shared hard interests in policies be-
yond the scope of democratization. For instance, 
Jordan under King Abdullah II managed to be-
come a privileged partner of the EU primarily due 
to its readiness to support Western security and 
general foreign policy interests (by combating ter-
rorism and maintaining cooperation with Israel) 
rather than its commitment to political reforms, 
which, to date, have only been cosmetic.
The European Endowment for Democracy 
(EED), established by the EU in June 2012, reflects 
the EU’s aim of cooperating not only with (actu-
ally or potentially authoritarian) governments 
but also directly with civil society on the basis of 
shared democratic values. However, problems at 
different levels remain unresolved. Firstly, ap-
propriate funding has not yet been secured. Sec-
ondly, some conceptual problems appear to be 
grave: how partners from civil society will be cho-
sen – certainly a difficult task for a centralized in-
stitution with an office in Brussels only – has not 
been clarified (Richter and Leininger 2012). More-
over, in light of the Arab Spring it is questionable 
whether it is really the primary task of a quasi-
governmental organization such as the EU to ap-
proach Arab civil society. Rather, now that gov-
ernments have begun to be elected democratical-
ly, the EU’s primary task should be to approach 
those segments of the state institutions that actu-
ally or potentially share democratic values in or-
der to strengthen them vis-à-vis those who repre-
sent the old forces. It would actually have made 
more sense to establish the EED before rather than 
after the Arab Spring. Last but not least, given the 
relatively well-established European civil society 
organizations (for instance, the European political 
foundations), which interact with the civil society 
in the Arab world on an equal footing, the ques-
tion of what the added value of a quasi-govern-
mental European institution targeting Arab civil 
society will be arises.
Cooperation in Crucial Policy Fields: Economics 
and Migration
Not surprisingly, many Arab economies have 
been negatively affected in the short run as an im-
mediate effect of the political turmoil of the Ar-
ab Spring. Moreover, both the new governments 
and those that have survived but are under severe 
pressure to reform face the legacy of state-centered 
economies that were half-heartedly liberalized 
and adjusted to global challenges according to 
the (half-heartedly applied) criteria of the “Wash-
ington Consensus.” At the same time, in light of 
the Arab “youth bulge,” strong pressure exists to 
promote sustainable economic growth in order to 
create jobs. Although the Arab systems have not 
yet managed to develop sophisticated economic 
strategies to deal with the challenges of the Arab 
Spring, it is clear that Europe could and should 
– according to the civilian power approach – 
support its southern neighbors in two prima-
ry ways: by increasing economic exchange (both 
in terms of opening European markets to Arab 
goods and European investment in the Southern 
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Mediterranean region) and pursuing an active mi-
gration policy.
Previous economic policies of the EU towards 
the countries south of the Mediterranean have 
contributed to the partial liberalization of the Ar-
ab economies, particularly via association agree-
ments. At the same time, the EU has failed to open 
its markets in fields in which the Arab economies 
are competitive, in particular the agrarian sector 
and some branches of the service sector. There 
have been no recent initiatives to liberalize Euro-
pean markets for Arab products. Rather, the tra-
ditional European approach of harmonizing trade 
standards and practices is still being emphasized 
(Tocci 2011). This approach was successful in rela-
tions with Central and Eastern Europe after 1989; 
however, since there are fewer incentives for Eu-
ropean private capital to invest in the Arab world 
and because there is no prospect of EU member-
ship for the Southern Mediterranean countries, 
the European approach to the latter countries does 
not meet their needs.
As the political turmoil in the Arab world be-
gan to produce refugees, migration to Europe 
became an immediate issue to which major EU 
countries reacted by adopting a short-term secu-
rity-oriented approach. However, the main devel-
opment-related challenge in the medium to long 
term will in all likelihood be economically driven 
migration from the Middle East to Europe. Even if 
Arab economies manage to significantly increase 
growth, the Arab “youth bulge” will most likely 
create two developmental needs: first, the provi-
sion of access to higher education facilities in Eu-
rope to Arab students and, second, the offering of 
temporary assignments with training components 
to young professionals. Both will require an ac-
tive and targeted migration policy. However, thus 
far there have been no strong indicators that the 
EU will abandon its fairly restrictive migration 
policy towards the Southern Mediterranean re-
gion, which is tailored to what Europe defines as 
its security needs rather than to the development 
needs of the Arab world. In this respect, a basic 
limit of the civilian power approach becomes ap-
parent: since European societies are still strug-
gling to embrace the model of immigration coun-
tries and instead tend to uphold cultural barriers, 
particularly with respect to Islamic countries, the 
EU’s reluctance to abandon the security-oriented 
approach of its migration policy may be compre-
hended as democratic, even though it is not com-
patible with the civilian power approach.
How to Deal with EU Rhetoric
Two years after the beginning of the Arab Spring, 
there are few indicators that the EU has used the 
transformation in the Arab world as an opportu-
nity for a comeback as a civilian power in its re-
lations with the countries south of the Mediterra-
nean. Two conclusions should be drawn from this. 
When it comes to the empirical analysis of EU for-
eign policy towards the Southern Mediterranean 
countries, other approaches should be given prior-
ity. Moreover, it is advisable that researchers ana-
lyze European policies – rather than the policies of 
the EU (which should be perceived as being em-
bedded in the policies of member states and Eu-
ropean actions in international organizations such 
as NATO and the World Bank) – towards the Ar-
ab Middle East, thereby focusing on specific policy 
fields rather than on general catch-all issues, in or-
der to avoid being trapped by EU rhetoric. At the 
same time, in the case of political debates, politi-
cal consultation and normative analyses, the civil-
ian power approach should still be applied, since 
the EU’s self-image as a different actor (meant to 
imply that it is more mature and somehow “bet-
ter” than others) needs to be dealt with in a crit-
ical way. In this way, those segments of the EU 
bureaucracy that perceive the receipt of the No-
bel Prize as an obligation to meet these standards 
in the future and are ready to walk the talk of the 
EU’s self-image could be strengthened and acti-
vated.
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